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STOCK OPTIONS AND OTHER EXECUTIVE
INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS
CHARLES W. STEADMAN*

The immense economic expansion and changes of the post-war
period have generated numerous problems. In American business a
major product of this is to be found in the difficulty of developing
and maintaining the reservoir of executive talent at levels sufficiently
high that managerial functions can continue to be performed with an
advanced degree of efficiency. The shortage of qualified executives
has been widely reported. The competition for those available is
intense and increasing.
Unfortunately, it would seem that at the very time the need is
greatest the normal incentives for an individual to assume major
executive status have been most severely reduced. The promise of
greater income has little efficacy to induce an executive to work
harder or to assume a more demanding position. The current, unprecedented scale of the graduated income tax causes the greater
part of any increase in pay to be absorbed in taxes. An executive with
a present taxable income of $60,000 could pay $7,800 out of a $10,000
raise to the U. S. Treasury.1 Such results will hardly produce substantial incentive.
At the same time the constant inflation of the past twenty years
has eroded the value of the dollars that remain to such an extent that
it has become exceedingly difficult to build an estate and to provide
properly for one's own retirement. Thus, the $2,200 that remain from
the executive's $10,000 raise in the previous example would have
the purchasing power of only eleven hundred 1940 dollars and we
may expect that its purchasing power will be reduced even further.
The need to develop and encourage executive talent in the face
of the incentive-destroying factors which have arisen has forced a
drastic reassessment of traditional corporate incentive devices. Because simple increases in present income of the executive have
proved ineffective, the corporation, its executives and its attorneys
have been constrained to develop new means of compensation. These
are frequently described as "deferred incentive compensation plans."
It is our intention to discuss in this article what these plans are,
by whom they may be used, and the advantages which may flow
* Attorney, Marshman, Hollington & Steadman, Cleveland, Ohio, and Steadman, Collier & Shannon, Washington, D.C.
1. Under INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 1, taxable income over $60,000 but less
than $70,000 is taxed at a rate of 78%. Hence, of the $10,000 increase in
salary, $7,800 would be paid in income taxes.
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from their proper application. While there are many combinations
of such plans possible, this article is concerned primarily with those
which may be designed for the executives in higher income levels.
It is here that the aberrations caused by exceedingly high income tax
rates have created the greatest need for incentive arrangements.
Human nature being what it is such incentives are necessary and
beneficial to the nation in deriving the utmost from executive talent.
Generally speaking, the executive's aim is to develop a program
which will give his family security, which will result in a lower total
tax burden, and which will possibly give him a chance for considerable growth of his capital. He may very well desire to defer
income presently earned until the time of his retirement when his
income will presumably be lower and consequently so will his income
taxes. By this means he may have an adequate income upon retirement. It may be vital to his security that he have a hedge against
inflation and this can be achieved by a stock bonus plan. Whatever
may be his needs these deferred incentive compensation plans constitute one of the few means by which they may be fulfilled.
A properly designed deferred incentive compensation plan creates
joint benefits. It benefits the executive and his family, and by so
doing may also bring a considerable return to his corporate employer.
These plans do encourage an ever-higher standard of performance
by the beneficiary-executive. The corporate employer can further
benefit inasmuch as such plans can instill in their beneficiary-executives a loyalty and strengthen the will and desire of these individuals
to remain with the organization. Moreover, if benefits are made
contingent upon retirement and provision is made for the executive's
family in the event of his prior death, he will have an ease of mind
which will permit him to devote full attention to his work. Deferred
vesting of incentive compensation and forfeiture of benefits in the
event an executive voluntarily leaves his position prior to retirement
is an invaluable inducement to the executive to remain with the
corporation and may even be used to retain his advisory services
following retirement.
From the point of view of both the executive and the corporation
it is clear that an incentive compensation plan must be carefully
tailored to meet each individual situation. Whether the plan is intended for an individual or for a group of executives, each situation
will have its peculiar problems and the plan must be carefully designed to meet them.
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I.

TYPES OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

PLANS AVAILABLE AND THEm FUNCTIONS

Among the most widely used of present-day incentive compensation
devices is the "restricted" stock option.2 With such an option, certain
tax advantages are granted, notably capital gains on the sale of the
stock by the optionee if the rules established by law are followed.
A restricted stock option is in a unique position as an incentive plan,
however, and it is appropriate that its functions, advantages and
disadvantages be discussed below in considerable detail.
Where for some reason a restricted stock option is not an appropriate vehicle for executive incentive compensation, there are several
other devices which may be successfully and imaginatively employed.
These include pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus and annuity plans
or a combination of these. Some plans may be funded, while others,
such as the retirement programs of certain corporations, may remain
unfunded and still be adequately secure.
Among these arrangements it is natural that the profit-sharing
plan should be highly regarded as a means of providing incentive.
'The executive may see clearly uilder such a plan the fruits of his
efforts. The plan is often ideal for a growing company with an
irregular profit record and excellent potential because no definite
financial commitment is involved., But it has broad possibilities for
application and is widely used by organizations of all sizes, among
them many of the nation's largest and strongest industrial concerns.
The profit-sharing plan is not used primarily to provide retirement
income. It is rather designed to reward a key executive for especial
performance. Income so derived can be spread over a period of years.
This has the combined effect of preventing peaks and valleys in his
income3 and alleviating the impact of income taxes in many circumstances. Spreading payments will have retirement income features if
the plan is so drawn that amounts earned remain unpaid at the point
of retirement and are to be paid for a period of years after retirement
in the same manner as before, for example.
The function of the stock bonus plan is somewhat different from
that of the profit-sharing plan although it, too, may be successfully
employed as an incentive device. Where the plan is directed primarily
to a group of key executives, as opposed to a whole range of employees, those executives can see the fruits of their efforts in the
increased value of the stock. In this sense it is related to profits and
has substantial incentive elements. If the plan is not directly keyed
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421.
3. Such peaks and valleys will produce a higher total income tax than
the same amount of income spread out evenly over a period of years due to
the effect of the graduated income tax.
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to profits, however, the incentive value of the plan may not be as
great as that of a profit-sharing plan. The stock bonus plan is nonetheless coming into increasing favor as a means of rewarding the individual efforts of key executives. One reason is that a stock bonus
from a successful company is one of the soundest possible hedges
against inflation. The stock bonus plan is often used in lieu of or as a
supplement to a pension or annuity plan. The fact that it need not be
dependent upon profits makes it attractive as a means for rewarding
executive personnel for past excellence-for profits already created.
It should be pointed out that a stock bonus plan may be difficult
to implement in a closely-held corporation where valuation of the
stock is difficult and where the equity of the shareholders may be
easily diluted. The other side of the coin, of course, is that since a
stock bonus plan will not dissipate liquid assets this may at times
outweigh the disadvantages which have been mentioned.
A pension or annuity plan 4 ordinarily has no place in the field of
incentive compensation as a means of inducing superior performance
by the corporate executive. When pension rights are properly
restricted as to vesting, of course, a pension plan has the same value
as other types of plans in encouraging a key executive to remain
with the corporation and to render advisory services following retirement. It may well be a useful supplement to a stock bonus or
profit-sharing plan but it is not a successful performance incentive
when used alone except to the extent that it may indirectly create a
desire by the recipient to exert greater effort for the success of his
benefactor.
It should be pointed out here that the structure of the plan chosen
can have vast effect upon its tax consequences. The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 accords special favorable tax treatment to profit-sharing,
stock bonus and annuity plans that fall within its provisions. Such
plans are called "qualified." 5 As we shall see, however, these plans
are largely unsuited for the purpose of executive incentive compensation because the code provisions require that too great a percentage of a corporation's employees be included. As a result, a "nonqualified" plan, which can be fashioned to satisfy the particular needs
of a corporation and its executives is normally best employed where
incentive considerations, before or after the fact so to speak, are
present. Nonetheless, the tax treatment of qualified plans is so
favorable that they will be examined with a view toward determining
4. U.S. Treasury Regulations define a pension plan as " ..... a plan established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically

for the payment of definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a
period of years, usually for life, after retirement." Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1) (i) (1958). An annuity plan comprehends a contract under which amounts
will be paid out in the future for a period of years certain or for life.
5. INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04.
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whether or not they can be successfully used as executive incentive
devices.

II.

RESTRICTED STOCK OPTIONS

In this era of high prosperity and greatly expanded production, it
has not been unusual to see common stocks of successful corporations
triple or even quadruple over a rather short period of time. In many
instances this may have resulted only from the general expansion of
the economy. In others, however, it may be ascribed directly to the
brilliant efforts of one or a few key executives who have taken advantage of the opportunity offered by the state of the economy. If
these executives had ample capital, they could profit from the results
of their efforts by buying the corporation's stock in the open market,
in cases where the stock is traded. With the difficulty of creating
capital out of ordinary income however, it is often true that they
are not in such a position, or if they have capital it may be otherwise
employed. In such a situation, what is needed is a means by which
the executive can have an opportunity to participate in the growth
of the corporation through ownership of its stock without being required to make an immediate outlay of capital by present purchase of
such stock.
This function is in fact performed by the "restricted" stock option.
This is a device by which the executive is granted an option to purchase stock of the corporation at a certain price at some time in the
future. If the statutory criteria are met, upon disposition of the stock
the optionee will be taxed at capital gains rates.6 The corporation
itself will receive no deduction at any time, but no income will result
to the executive at the time of the actual purchase of the stock and
the corporation is treated as receiving no consideration other than
the price paid under the option for the optioned stock.7 An opportunity for capital gains income in this manner may be far more beneficial to an executive than a mere increase in salary taxed at extraordinarily high rates.
The restricted stock option is an especially important incentive
device. Options will normally be given to executives who are so
placed that they can directly affect the value of the options given to
them. The rules are stufficiently flexible that option may be given to
selected individuals and different exercise terms may be given to
different individuals. 8 Furthermore, the option may be so restricted
that it is cancellable on the termination of the optionee's employment.9 The corporation can thereby maintain some control over the
optionee's services.

6.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 421.

7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a).
8. Rev. Rul. 59-198, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 91.
9. Treas. Reg., § 1.421-1(a) (1) (1957).
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Like stock bonus plans, a restricted stock option plan may be a
more appropriate incentive compensation vehicle for the publicly-held
enterprise than for the closely held corporation. The danger of dilution of shareholders' equity in a close corporation is considerable.
Furthermore, since the shares of these corporations usually have no
ready market, the incentive value of the option may be somewhat
diminished.
The requirements for qualification of a restricted stock option are
rigid and they must be precisely followed to secure favorable tax
treatment. The option must be granted to the executive by reason of
his employment and must be exercised during such employment or
within three months of the termination of the employment relationship. 10 The employee will not receive capital gains treatment if the
option stock is disposed of by him within two years of the time the
option is granted or within six months of its exercise." The option
rights must be nontransferrable during the life of the optionee 12 and
the option must be exercisable over a period of not more than ten
years.13 Finally the option price must be not less than eighty-five
percent of the fair market value of the stock at the time of the grant. 14
An exception to the eighty-five percent requirement was incorporated
into the 1954 Code to allow relatively closely-held corporations to
employ restricted stock options. Prior to 1954, no option could qualify
if the optionee held more than ten percent of the voting stock of the
corporation. 5 To enable the corporate entrepreneur to obtain outside
financing without incurring risk of loss of control, the Internal
Revenue Code now permits the grant of options to an individual
regardless of the percentage of stock in the corporation owned by him.
In the case of a person owning more than ten percent of the shares
in a corporation, however, the option price must be at least one
hundred and ten percent of the fair market value of the stock.16
It is now becoming apparent that within this rigid statutory framework a corporation may exercise broad discretion as to the conditions
which it imposes on the enjoyment of the stock option plan by its
executives. It is recognized, for example, that the right to exercise
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421 (a).
11. Ibid.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(d) (1) (B). However,

during his lifetime,
the optionee may appoint the individual who is to have the power to exercise
the option on his death. Treas. Reg., § 1.421-2(a) (4) (1957).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(d) (1) (D). In the case of an individual
owning ten per cent or more of the voting stock of the corporation, the option
must be exercised within five years of the time of the grant. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 421(d) (1) (c).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421 (d) (1) (A).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 130(A), added by 64 Stat. 942 (1950).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(d) (1) (c). S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1954).
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the option may be postponed for any length of time within the scope
17
of the ten year rule.
Although the Internal Revenue Code itself establishes employment
criteria, 18 its provisions limit only the right of the employee to
exercise the option. The corporation's interest may call for a restriction on the right of the employee to dispose of the stock after it is
transferred to him. A balancing of interest should be considered, but
if there are too many restrictions upon the employee's enjoyment of
the option's benefits its purposes for incentive will be defeated. It
would appear that the employee may exercise the option in toto at any
time that he is an employee or within three months after the termination of the employee relationship and still be treated as having
exercised a restricted stock option.
Under the code, it is likewise possible to grant options for a block
of shares to be exercised in series over a period of time. For example,
an option may be granted for 3,000 shares, 1,000 exercisable after the
expiration of one year, an additional 1,000 after two years, and the final
segment after three years. The Internal Revenue Service treats this
arrangement as three separate options all granted on the same date.' 9
The previously mentioned restrictions impinge only on the right
to exercise the option, but leave the employee absolute freedom of
activity after he acquires the stock. It is now apparent that the
Internal Revenue Service will not disqualify plans which impose
restrictions on the disposition of the stock by the employee for a
limited period of time after the exercise of the option.20 Thus, it is
possible to require the employee to endorse the stock in blank and
place it with the corporation for a limited period.
In summary, it can be readily seen that a restricted stock option
is an invaluable incentive device. It does not have any large tangible
value at the moment of granting, however, and where such tangible
value is required, some other plan must be used. It is to these that
we now turn.

III. QUALIFM

PLANS

As has been pointed out, the "qualified" deferred compensation
plan is often disregarded as a device for executive incentive compensation. The income tax advantages of a qualified plan are so substantial however, that it should be considered with a view to determining whether these outweigh the inherent disadvantages of such a
plan and whether a qualified plan can be adapted as an incentive device for a relatively small number of executives.
§ 421 (d) (1) (D).
§ 421 (a).
19. Treas. Reg., § 1.421-1 (a) (3) (1957).
20. Rev. Rul. 467, 1954-2 CUM. BuLL. 207.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
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What are these advantages? A trust forming part of a qualified
deferred compensation plan is not taxable on its income unless it is
a "feeder organization," engages in a "prohibited transaction" or has
"unrelated business taxable income. '21 The employer secures an
immediate deduction for its contributions to the trust or for amounts
paid under a qualified annuity plan.z2 The beneficiary will not actually
be taxed until he receives amounts under the plan.23 Long-term

capital gains treatment will be accorded to a payee or distributee
under a qualified trust or annuity plan if the total amount payable is
paid within one year following certain specified events.2 4 If a total
-distribution is made under a qualified trust or annuity plan within
one year of the death of an employee by reason of the employee's
death, up to $5,000 will be excludable from the gross income of the
distributee.2 The value of an annuity or other payment receivable
by a beneficiary (other than the executor) of a decedent under an
employee's trust or a retirement annuity contract may be excluded
26
from the decedent's gross estate.
The difficulty with qualified plans is that the same statute which
grants certain benefits also imposes severe limitations on the percentage of income which may be committed to the plan 7 and considerable restrictions as to the plan's coverage.
While the Internal Revenue Code does not define qualified deferred
compensation plans, it does set forth in subchapter D the criteria
which will cause a trust or annuity contract forming part of a plan
to be qualified.
A trust forming part of a qualified plan must:
(1) be formed for the purpose of distributing the corpus and
income of the fund accumulated to the employees or their beneficiaries;
(2) be for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their
beneficiaries;
(3) cover employees in such a manner as not to discriminate in
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). "Feeder organization" is defined in
§ 402, "prohibited transaction" in § 503 and "unrelated business taxable income" in § 512.
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404.
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402 relates to beneficiaries of employee trusts.

Taxation of beneficiaries of qualified annuities is covered in INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 403.
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§§ 402 (b) and 403 (a) (2).
§ 101 (b).
§ 2039 (c).
27. The limitations are contained in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a). Generally not more than 5% of the compensation paid or accrued during the
taxable year to all employees under the trust may be deducted. The limitation for stock bonus and profit-sharing plans is 15% of such compensation.
There are numerous exceptions not discussed here.
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favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or other employees whose primary job is the supervision of other employees;
and
(4) not discriminate in contributions or benefits provided in
favor of those employees mentioned in (3) above.
In addition, the program must be "permanent" and communicated
in writing to the employees.2 8
Despite the restrictive nature of these provisions, the qualified
plan should not be ignored in the development of an adequate incentive plan for executives. Over a number of years, the amounts in
a given individual's account may grow to many thousands of dollars.
The area of inquiry here should be the means by which the key
executive or group of executives may receive as large a share of
deferred compensation as possible and yet permit the plan to remain
within the established rules. 29
There must of course be compliance with all statutory criteria.
The greatest obstacles in this regard are those designed to prevent
discrimination in favor of certain specified groups.
Such discrimination may occur in a number of ways:
(1) by establishing compulsory employee contributions which
are so large a percentage of the employee's salary that only the
30
best paid groups can participate;
(2) by weighing the benefits and distributions formulae so that
highly-paid or supervisory employees or shareholders are favored;
and 3'
(3) by establishing longevity or age limitations for participation which initially or in practice favor highly-paid or supervisory
employees or shareholders.3
The plan must eliminate these or it will fail of qualification.
A. Integration With Social Security Benefits
Of the forms of qualified plans, the one that probably provides the
corporation with the best opportunity to meet its key executives'
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). The above requirements are detailed
in Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (a) (2) (1958).

29. Some risks may have to be taken in establishing a plan, particularly
when speed is required. A clause may be inserted in a plan about which there
is doubt as to qualification which will permit recovery of company contributions in the event that the plan is later found not qualified. Rev. Rul. 59-309,
1959; INT. REV. BULL. No. 13 at 10.
30. Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 4(g), 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 128.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1956); Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 5.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3); Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 4 (a-h) 1957-1
Cum. BULL. 128.
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needs is one which is "integrated" with social security (OASI) 3 or a
similar retirement program such as the Railroad Retirement Act.
This integrating is permitted by the Internal Revenue Code. 35
A properly integrated plan will permit a corporation to establish
a pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan in which only salaried
employees earning more than $4,200 may participate. 36 As a matter of
practice, in many small corporations this may well restrict the list
of those eligible to the executive level and a few others. Such a
plan is called a "$4,200 excess" plan and provides benefits related
only to that part of an individual's compensation which is in excess
of $4,200.
The basic requirement of such a plan is that benefits paid to beneficiaries be no greater, proportionally to their income, than the
benefits received by lower-paid employees. If such proportionality is
achieved, a plan which would not otherwise qualify will be considered
37
qualified under the code.
The Internal Revenue Service for purposes of determining whether
such benefits are more than proportional, has decreed that: "Normal
annual retirement benefits for any employee cannot exceed 371/
percent of his average annual compensation in excess of $4200 ....-38
This percentage is based upon a series of assumptions as to the total
value of OASI payments and the percentage contributed by the employee.3
The Internal Revenue Service has further determined that a profitsharing plan which excludes lower-paid employees as described above
will be considered integrated, assuming it was created after May
3, 1951,40 only if:
(1)the employer has no other plan involving integration with OASI
benefits;
(2)the plan provides benefits only upon retirement or separation from
33. 50 Stat. 439 (1937), as amended, 72 Stat. 1659 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 3121
(1954).
34. 66 Stat. 777 (1952), 45 U.S.C. §228(a) (1952).
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a) (5). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(3)
(1956); Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 4 (i),
1957-1 Cum. BULL. 128.
36. Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 4 (i)(1) 1957-1 Cum. BULL. On other occasions
on which Congress has raised the level of remuneration subject to OASI
taxation, the Internal Revenue Service has made a commensurate change in
the income level at which "excess" plans may begin. In 1958 the maximum
amount of income subject to OASI taxation was raised to $4800, effective
January 1, 1959. 72 Stat. 1659 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (a) (1958). No further
change has yet been made, however, by the Internal Revenue Service. Notwithstanding, it would seem that the language of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 401 (a) (5) would permit employers contemplating an integrated plan to
use the new $4,800 level.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(3) (1) (1956).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3 (2) (i) (1956).
39. See CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAx REP., 1 2609.46, where a complete explanation is given.
40. The date on which these restrictions were promulgated.
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service and all contributions are allocated upon a non-discriminatory basis
when made; and
(3) the amount of employer contributions allocated to any particular
participant in any year does not exceed one-fourth of the benefit rate
described above, or nine and three-eighths percent of eligible employees'
compensation. (37%k% x 25%).41
It is clear that such a plan may have considerable potential for
the small corporation and perhaps even the large one. It permits substantial amounts to be set aside. It is conceivable that an executive
with an annual income of $60,000 could have over $5,200 set apart in a
profit-sharing plan each year to be taxed at lower rates in future
years when his total income is greatly reduced. 42 On the other hand,
if this were given to him directly in the form of increased income,
assuming a taxable income of $50,000 the executive could immediately
pay out more than $3,500 in additional taxes. 43 The executive would
also have the additional advantage of the tax-exempt status of the
trust with respect to income on all amounts set aside for him.44
Likewise, an executive with an annual income of $50,000 could
well have provided for him upon retirement a pension of $17,000.45
It would seem, then, that the benefits of an integrated plan are so
substantial that they should not be disregarded. They may at the
very least provide a base for satisfactory incentive compensation of
the executive and at the same time save the corporation substantial
amounts.
It can be seen, as I have said, that the restrictions imposed even
on integrated plans are substantial. Benefits are tied directly to
individual compensation. If a profit-sharing plan is employed, as
would be normal where the purpose is to prbvide a performance
incentive to the executive, a contribution which is less than the
maximum permitted in a given year cannot be made up in the next. 4 6
An integrated plan would doubtless be of little use to a large corporation. It would encompass so many individuals that it would not
be possible to restrict it largely to persons for whom the corporation
desired to create an incentive. In the small corporation however, a
general integrated profit-sharing plan might in fact cover largely the
persons who were responsible for the company's success. 47 The tax
41. Mim. 6641, 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 41, 56; see also Rev. Rul. 56-692, 19562 Cum. BULL. 287. A minimum contribution of $60 in any one year is permitted
as a matter of administrative convenience.
42. This amount is derived by subtracting $4,200 from $60,000, leaving
$55,800. The latter figure is then multiplied by 9-3/8%.

43. An executive with a taxable income of $50,000 is in the 75% income tax

bracket. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (a).
45. This amount is derived by subtracting $4200 from $50,000, leaving
$45,800. The latter figure is then multiplied by 37Y2%.
46. Mim. 6641, 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 41.
47. Thus, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled favorably for the employer
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advantages might then become so great that they would overcome the
disadvantage of including persons who might not otherwise be covered
in an incentive compensation scheme.
B. Savings Additions
There has recently been developed a little known but very important furtherance of deferred compensation. This is the voluntary
savings plan which can be added to qualified profit-sharing, retirement or pension, or stock bonus plans, approved by the Treasury and
established under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 401.
This voluntary savings plan, which is in addition to other features of
the qualified plans that have been discussed, may provide that each
individual employee covered by the plan may contribute to a fund
each year an amount not to exceed ten percent of his annual compensation.4 8 The trust fund established under the plan would accept
the employee's contributions and these become a part of his share in
the total fund. He acquires in this way all of the tax advantages
which have been outlined before and are otherwise applicable to
contributions by employer or employee to these approved plans.
Under these circumstances the tax advantages become rather apparent:
1) Investment income from these voluntary contributions will
be tax free and can be reinvested tax free until the time of payment by the fund.
2) The investment and all income therefrom will be subject to
capital gains treatment at the time of payment rather than
being taxed as ordinary income.
This voluntary savings arrangement can be of particular advantage
to the shareholder-officer, especially if he is in the higher tax brackets.
He may participate in the same manner and to the same extent as
any other employee.
In addition to the tax savings, several other points should be noted.
The voluntary savings plan can be made quite flexible. It may permit the segregation and investment and reinvestment of the voluntary
contributions in higher yield investments if that is considered to be
in two situations where integrated pension plans were employed. In one, a
company had 2000 employees, of whom 300 were covered, with five of the
covered employees owning stock. This stock represented 20% of the outstanding stock of the company. Thirty of the employees were officers or supervisory personnel. I.T. 3613, 1943 Cum. BULL. 475. On another, the company
had 1000 employees of whom only 100 were covered. No employees owned
more than five per cent of the company's stock, but ninety owned some stock.
Fifteen employees were officers or had primarily supervisory duties. I.T.
3614, 1943 Cum. BULL. 476. In a smaller company, an even lesser proportion
of employees might be beneficiaries.
48. Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 21-11.
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desirable, as it well might be in the instance of executive personnel
whose incomes are substantial. It may provide that the employee
may borrow his voluntary savings for emergencies. Furthermore,
the voluntary contributions and the income thereon must be nonforfeitable, guaranteeing the employee the right to receive them upon
his severance from the corporation.
Because of these advantages many corporations which now have
plans may find it worthwhile to consider amending to include a
savings provision. 49 Many others who have been reluctant to previously initiate qualified plans might well reconsider in view of this
development. Especially is this true of those employers who have
not been willing to make the maximum contribution to all employees
and thus have restricted their own tax benefits. It is now possible to
establish a plan with a lower percentage of employer contributions
and yet enable the stockholder-officer to take full advantage of the
tax savings provisions through voluntary contributions. Admittedly,
the voluntary tax contribution is in after tax dollars but nonetheless
the savings are very substantial. 50
A caveat should be added. In approving these plans providing for
voluntary contributions not in excess of ten percent, the treasury
has indicated that the purpose of the plan must be to encourage savings on the part of the employees.5 1 Consistent with this view, cer149. An example of a provision which might be used in amending or adopting such a plan is as follows:
"Contributions by Employees. Employees may also make voluntary contributions to the Fund in any amount not to exceed ten per cent (10%) of their
Annual Compensation from the COM]PANY. Voluntary contributions by the
employee as provided herein shall be allocated, immediately upon receipt, to
the account of the employee making the contribution and shall thereafter be
administered in exactly the same manner as contributions made by the COMPANY except that, under no circumstances shall these employer contributions
or any increment therein or income therefrom be forfeited, and the entire
amount of principal and income shall be payable to the employee upon
termination of his services with COVPANY regardless of the cause of such
terminatibn or the length of his employment. The voluntary savings provision
contained in this paragraph is designed to encourage savings among the
employees of COlVIPANY in accordance with the provisions of Revenue Ruling
59-185, 1959 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21 at 11. It is the intent of this paragraph
that this provision permit the maximum savings allowable under said Revenue
Ruling but that it remain in effect only to the extent that it does not disqualify
the balance of the plan and, to the extent that the aforesaid Revenue Ruling
is hereafter qualified, amended, amplified or overruled, this paragraph shall
be amended accordingly."
50. For example, a shareholder-officer in the 50% tax bracket has the
choice of putting $2000 in a trust fund of a qualified plan earning 6% or
personally investing it elsewhere at the same 6% rate. At the end of ten
years the earnings personally invested would amount to $687 after taxes.
The earnings of the trust fund would amount to $1,583 before taxes. However,
he is entitled to apply capital gains rates, or a maximum of 25%, to these
earnings if he withdraws them in a lump sum. Thus the maximum tax would
be $395, leaving earnings after taxes of $1,187 as opposed to the $687 personally invested.
51. See note 48 supra.
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tain other conditions must be met in obtaining approval of such a
provision. The basic plan must be a qualified employee benefit plan
under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The employer
contribution under the basic plan should in no way be dependent
upon the voluntary contributions of the employee. All employees
eligible in the basic plan must be able to participate in the voluntary
savings plan. All voluntary contributions must be used solely to
provide benefits for the individual contributors.
IV.

NONQUALIFIED EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE

COMPENSATION PLANS

In many situations, the restrictions imposed even on qualified integrated plans are so great that another method must be used to grant
key executives adequate incentive compensation. Normally, where
the restricted stock option is not employed, this is done by means of a
"nonqualified" stock bonus or profit-sharing plan.
These plans have a great advantage found in none of the other
methods discussed. They have almost limitless flexibility. They can
be tailored to the peculiar needs of one executive or a small group of
executives. The vesting of benefits can be so conditioned that the
corporation can assure itself of the executives' services for years to
come and they can likewise prevent the key executive from working
for a competitor. Furthermore, a given plan can be so arranged that
individual effort and skill can be rewarded even in the face of a poor
general company earnings record. The plan need not be cast in
general terms so as to reward an entire group proportionally to its
members' income as in a qualified plan. The very fact that individual
initiative can be rewarded should serve as an incentive to the entire
group. Thus it is that a key executive incentive plan is almost invariably, and necessarily a nonqualified one.
The incentive program, if it comprehends a profit-sharing, should
aim at a level which represents truly superior effort. The net profit
motive is quite satisfactory, so long as it is limited to that proportion
of profits which is above a reasonable standard for the company or the
industry of which it is a member.
While it may be desirable to establish a method by which profits
or shares from a stock bonus plan may be systematically allocated,
there is much to be said for leaving such allocation to a group of
directors or top-echelon managers so that the rewards can be distributed where they are most deserved. Such an approach, indeed,
simply takes advantage of the unique flexibility of nonqualified plans.
A. Tax Consequences of Nonqualified PlansRestrictive Clauses
As has been pointed out above, the nonqualified incentive corn-
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pensation program loses the desirable tax advantages of a qualified
plan. The employer may not take a deduction when amounts are
paid out under a plan unless these amounts are "nonforfeitable" by
the employee.5 2 If nonforfeitable, however, they will probably be
taxable income to the employee. 53 The employee will not be accorded
capital gains treatment for distributions made within one year4 and
the provisions of section 2039 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
55
will not apply.
Actually these tax consequences may not be as undersirable as
might appear on the surface. Let us assume, for example, that a
corporation is being taxed at 52% on its large, current profits. One
of its executives has a taxable income of $60,000 per year. The corporation wishes to reward him for his efforts. If it increases his salary
by $20,000, the corporation's income tax will be reduced by $10,400
($20,000 x 52%), 56 making the net cost to the corporation $9,600. At the
same time the executive could pay current income taxes of $16,900,
leaving him a net increased salary of only $3,100.
If the corporation takes the net cost of $9,600 and sets it aside for
the executive by means of a properly-conceived nonqualified incentive
compensation scheme, however, both the corporation and the executive may be in a significantly better position. The net cost to the
corporation is no greater than if it had given the executive a $20,000
increase in salary.5 7 The corporation may also be able to take a
later deduction of this $9,600 when it is actually paid to the executive.
From the executive's point of view, the $9,600 may well be more
real income when paid in later years. It may be invested in stock
of the corporation and the stock may appreciate considerably. Other
-income producing investments may be made. Furthermore, it will
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5); Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1956).
'"Nonforfeitable," a term of art in the tax law, will be discussed immediately
below.
53. Pension Fund Service Ruling, No. 9, Aug. 4, 1944. P-H 1959 FED. TAx
SEv. 1 15,465.1.
54. The treatment accorded to qualified trusts and annuities under INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2) and 403(a) (2) is not accorded to nonqualified
plans. See note 24 supra.
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (C) does not apply to nonqualified annuities.
56. The rate of taxation on all amounts of corporate net income greater than
$25,000 is 52%. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11.

57. In fact, the corporation will even have a slightly greater net income.
If it has $100,000 net taxable income, but reduces its net taxable income to
$80,000 by payment of a $20,000 increase in salary to one of its executives, it
will pay income taxes on $80,000. The income tax on the first $25,000 will be
$7,500. The tax on the remaining $55,000 will be $28,600, leaving a net income
after taxes of $43,900. On the other hand, if it sets apart $9,600 in a nonqualifled plan, it will still have net taxable income of $100,000. At the same time,
subtracting the taxes paid on $100,000 net taxable income ($46,500) from
actual net income ($91,400), the corporation still has net income after taxes
of $44,900 or $1,000 more than if the executive were given a deductible increase in salary of $20,000.
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probably be paid out to the executive at a time when his other income
is reduced by retirement to such an extent that he is in a far lower
income tax bracket.
Again, it should be pointed out that such results may be achieved
because the nonqualified incentive compensation plan is such a
flexible instrument.
The factors which have been discussed above lead to the conclusion
that these are the most desirable tax consequences that can flow
from a nonqualified plan:
(1) amounts paid out by the corporation to the beneficiary of a
plan should be deductible as they are paid out; and
(2) these amounts should not be taxable to the beneficiary until
they are actually received by him.
It follows from the above that certain points should be borne in mind
in developing a nonqualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus
plan.
B. The Plan Should Not Provide for Immediate Vesting of Benefits
No plan which provides for immediate vesting of benefits will
preserve for the beneficiary the most desirable tax consequences. This
is true whether the plan comprehends a trust or not.
If the plan does include a nonexempt (nonqualified) trust, the key
to the problem is whether or not the benefits set aside for the
account of beneficiaries are "forfeitable." As stated in U. S. Treasury
Regulations, contributions to a trust are nonforfeitable "if there is
no contingency under the plan which may cause the employee to lose
his rights in the contribution."
It would thus appear that if there
are any substantial conditions attached to the credits to beneficiaries
under which a beneficiary may lose his rights, those credits will be
deemed "forfeitable." It would seem, however, that to be safe these
conditions should be substantial. This is evident from Oreste CasaleS?
where Casale was virtually sole owner of a corporation. He could
lose certain pension rights only by voluntarily leaving the corporation's employ prior to retirement without the corporation's consent or
accepted employment from a competitor without its consent. Th6
Tax Court concluded that these conditions were illusory and said,
"To sustain petitioner's argument of forfeitability in the light of the
record would be a gross distortion of fact. '60 The decision of the Tax
Court in the case was reversed on appeal, but the Tax Court's view
as to the validity of the forfeiture conditions would appear to be
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b) (1) (a) (2) (i) (1956); see also Schaefer v. Bowers
50 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1931); Julian Robertson, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946).

59. 26 T.C. 1020 (1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
60. 26 T.C. at 1026.
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undisturbed since the issue was scarcely touched upon and the
reversal was grounded upon the fact that the corporation was the true
owner of the life insurance policy which was being used to fund
retirement benefits.
If the contributions to a trust are deemed forfeitable at the time
they are granted, and they are contributed to a non-exempt trust
they will not be taxable income to the beneficiaries even if they later
become nonforfeitable. This is directly provided for by treasury
regulations, 61 and while it does appear to extend the applicable code
provision 62 somewhat, it is a benefit which should not be disregarded.
The more typical nonqualified plan does not comprehend a trust,
for reasons which will appear below. The Internal Revenue Code
makes no provision for taxation of beneficiaries on amounts contributed under such a plan and we are therefore thrown back to more
general principles of income tax accounting. Here, the primary concepts to be guarded against in order to avoid premature taxation of
beneficiaries are the "constructive receipt" and "economic benefit"
doctrines.
The "constructive receipt" doctrine "treats as taxable any income
which is unqualifiedly subject to the demand of a taxpayer on the
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, whether or
not such income has actually been received .... "6 3
The treasury has treated the subject in the Regulations:
"Income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its
receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. Thus, if a corporation credits its employees with bonus stock, but the stock is not
available to such employees until some future date, the mere crediting
64
on the books of the corporation does not constitute receipt."
It would seem that many of the restrictions which satisfy the
"forfeitability" tests likewise satisfy the "constructive receipt" doctrine, but these restrictions should be drafted so that they continue
up to the point that the money or other benefits are actually made
available to the beneficiary.
For example, the right to benefits contained in a nonqualified plan
can be made forfeitable:
(1) if the employee voluntarily leaves the corporation prior to

retirement without the consent of the corporation; or
(2) if upon leaving the corporation, whether before or after
retirement, the beneficiary works for a competing concern; or
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.402 (b)-l (a) (1956).
62. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (b).
63. Weil v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1949).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1957).
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(3) if the employee is required to hold himself available for
consultation and fails to do so.
In other words, the aim is to subject the right to the benefits to
such adequate restrictions that the beneficiary could at no time prior
to their being placed in his hands control their receipt. Naturally,
such restrictions have an invaluable nontax purpose for the corporation. If the executive has a large amount at stake in a stock bonus or
profit-sharing plan, he will certainly be less willing to leave the
corporation prior to the time provided under the plan. The restriction
on receipt thus gives a strong incentive to remain with the corporation and for that reason alone should be included in any incentive
compensation plan.
A slightly different problem is involved in the concept of "economic
benefit." This involves the power of the recipient or beneficiary to
dispose of the right to income or stock which he may not yet even
have.6 5 Thus, for example, it may well be that the right to receive
income which may be forfeited only upon the beneficiary's voluntary
departure from his employer has some economic value. To avoid any
problem of this nature, it is considered wise to put in a deferred
compensation agreement a broad nonalienability clause which will
void any efforts to sell, anticipate, alienate, assign, pledge or otherwise
convey any interest which the employee might have in future benefits.
If the above rules are followed, it would seem that they would
prevent any premature taxation of the beneficiary on amounts set
aside for him under a deferred incentive compensation plan.
C. The Plan Should OrdinarilyNot Employ a Trust
That section of Section 404 (a) dealing with taxation of employers
having nonqualified plans6 is a good deal broader than that relating
to taxation of beneficiaries of nonexempt trusts.67 It comprehends
payments made under any kind of plan, whether a trust or other
funded or non-funded plan. It is the only section of the Internal
65. The basic principles are enunciated in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940).
66. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 404 reads in part:
"Sec. 404(a) General RuZe.-If contributions are paid by an employer to or
under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid or accrued on account of any employee under a plan deferring
the receipt of such compensation ... they shall be deductible under this section, subject, however, to the following limitations as to the amounts deductible in any year:
"(5) Other Plans-In the taxable year when paid, if the plan is not one included in paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) [relating to qualified plans,] if the
employees' rights to or derived from such employer's contribution or such
compensation are nonforfeitable at the time the contribution or compensation is paid."
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (b).
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Revenue Code by which payments to beneficiaries may be deducted. 68
Here, again, the key to deductibility by the employers is forfeitability. If the amounts contributed or paid out under a nonqualified
plan are forfeitable, they cannot be deducted in the year paid out
and, in fact, under treasury regulations, they can never be deducted.
The pertinent U. S. Treasury Regulation reads: "If an amount is
paid during the taxable year to a trust or under a plan and the
employee's rights to such amounts are forfeitable at the time the
amount is paid, no deduction is allowable for any taxable year."69
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that amounts
paid to a trust are payments for the purpose of the regulation and
that if amounts contributed to the trust are forfeitable when paid, no
deduction may ever be taken by the employer. Indeed, this position
until recently has been generally accepted.
In two cases decided recently, under the Internal Revenue Code of
1939,70 however, the courts have come to opposite conclusions on
similar sets of facts. In both, the trusts to which profit-sharing contributions were made were styled "irrevocable." Benefits could be
forfeited by leaving the employers voluntarily, with all money forfeited being distributed to other beneficiaries of the trusts.
In Wesley Heat Treating Company,71 the U. S. Tax Court concluded
that amounts paid to the trusts were not deductible because the
employees' rights were forfeitable. The Tax Court accepted the
applicable treasury regulation, quoted above,72 in the most perfunctory manner and did not question its validity under the statute.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
Commissioner. It denied the taxpayer the right to deduct amounts
actually paid out because the taxpayer was on the accrual basis and
therefore the amounts could be deducted only when the trusts were
created. Apparently the court was prepared to concede that the
company's obligation to pay was determined as of the moment funds
were transferred irrevocably.
The court then went on, however, and said that if amounts paid
in were forfeitable, the employer could claim no deduction for any
taxable year. The court concluded that no deduction would be permitted unless amounts funnelled through a non-qualified trust were
nonforfeitable and taxable to the beneficiary.
68. Bailey v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 468, ajfd per curiam, 192 F.2d 574 (3d
Cir. 1951).
69. Treas. Reg.§ 1.404(a) -12 (1956).
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 23 (p) and 165. The regulation under which
these cases were decided, Treas. Reg. 111, § 39, 23 (p)-11 reads: "If an amount
is paid during the taxable year but the rights of the employee therein are
forfeitable at the time the amount is paid, no deduction is allowable for such
amount for any taxable year."
71. 30 T.C. 10 (1958).
72. See note 65 supra.
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On the other hand, the U. S. Court of Claims, in Russell Manufacturing Company v. United States73 distinguished Wesley on its
facts (although the basis for this distinction is obscure) and ruled
that amounts paid out of certain profit-sharing trusts to officers of
the corporation could be deducted by the company even though the
contribution to the trusts was forfeitable when paid in.
The court invalidated the regulations 4 as applied to compensation
paid in the year in question. The court's reasoning was based upon
section 23(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in which provision is made for compensation paid on account of an employee
under a nonqualified plan as well as contributions made to a pension,
profit-sharing or annuity plan.75 The court found in this statutory
distinction congressional recognition of the fact that contributions to
nonqualified trusts might later be paid out by the trusts and indicated that this was the "compensation" referred to in the statute. It
said:
In fact, the wording of Sec. 23(p)(1) strongly indicated a congressional
anticipation that "compensation" would be paid by a trustee, and a congressional intention that compensation paid by a trustee should be
deductible. In the first paragraph of Sec. 23(p)(1) Congress refers to
"contributions" "paid by an employer," whereas "compensation" is mentioned, significantly we think, without any reference to the person who
hands the compensation over to the employee.7 6
In view of the present uncertain state of this area, it would seem
wise to avoid the use of a trust in nonqualified plan where the employer desires to take a deduction on payments made to beneficiaries.
Use of a trust can only be an invitation to litigation. Furthermore,
even if the Russell reasoning is ultimately adopted, if the trust has
income, that income will be taxed to it.77
On the contrary, if the company is successful in preventing a trust
from arising under its nonqualified plan, there may be considerable
income tax savings. Thus, if a corporation has established a stock
bonus plan and keeps stock accrued to the credit of its executive in
its general accounts, dividends paid thereon and credited to the
executives' accounts will be only a bookkeeping transaction and no
tax consequences will arise. There will be no trust to tax and if
restrictive clauses have been carefully planned, there will be no
constructive receipt on the part of the beneficiary. As a result, when

73. CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (59-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 119582 (Ct. Cl.
July 15, 1959). The Internal Revenue Service announced on October 23, 1959
that it would not follow this decision 28 U.S.L. WEEK. 2187 (Oct. 27, 1959).
74. Quoted in note 70 supra.
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23 (p), 52 Stat. 464. (now INT. REV. CODE Or
1954, § 404).
76. Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (59-2
U.S. Tax Cas.).
77. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, beginning at § 641.
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stock or cash from the sale of stock is paid out, it can be argued that
that is the only payment made for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code and U. S. Treasury Regulations. Hence, if amounts paid out to
executives are nonforfeitable when paid out, they are deductible by
78
the corporation.
Similarly, if cash credits to the account of a given executive under
a plan are simply kept as a general liability of the corporation, no
payment is made for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and
U. S. Treasury Regulations until money is actually paid out to
beneficiaries. There is some danger, of course, in that these credits
are not segregated in a trust but instead remain available to general
creditors of the corporation. If the corporation is reasonably stable,
however, this should not be too great a disadvantage to the executive.
D. Some Suggested Nonqualified Plans
It may be helpful, in analyzing the desirability of a nonqualified
plan, to compare one which is contemplated with some which have
been placed in operation. It cannot be assumed that the broad general
outlines of the plans set forth below satisfy all conceivable needs nor
that the outlines themselves are sufficient to solve all problems which
may arise. The plans outlined do demonstrate the great variety of
forms which nonqualified plans may take.
1. An Unfunded Individual Deferred Compensation Contract.Under this kind of plan the corporation, before services are actually
rendered, promises to pay the key executive a certain sum per year
following his retirement. Deductions are taken as the amounts are
paid, and the amounts paid are taxable to the executive only when
paid. Such an agreement, of course, has value to the executive only
if the company is stable and with a reasonably certain future.
Such a plan can have, in addition to fixed retirement benefits, provisions to pay certain amount to the beneficiaries of the executive's
estate. The only limitation on the above payment, insofar as deductibility is concerned, is that they must not be so large as to be beyond
the bounds of ordinary and reasonable expenditures.7 9
2. The Key Executive Stock Bonus Plan.-Under a typical plan, a
committee of members of the board of directors selects employees
who are to receive credits for their services to the company. The
fund out of which these credits are to be made may be a specified
percentage of net profits after deducting a certain percentage on
invested capital, or may be based on some other formula designed
to spur the efforts of the executive. The dollar credits are converted
'78. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) -12.
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
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into stock of the company which is held, bought and sold as a general
asset of the company. The credits vest over a period of five to ten
years. Dividends are credited to each beneficiary in accordance with
the number of shares credited to his account and vest in a manner
similar to stock credits. Payments are made to beneficiaries in cash
or in stock of the company over a period of years following retirement
and, sometimes, death benefits are provided for.
Care must be taken to assure that the actual stock purchased by
the company may be sold or interchanged and that no specific shares
are set aside for a given executive. The danger is that the Internal
Revenue Service may conclude that a trust exists and will therefore
deny deductibility when amounts are paid out by the company.
3. Deferred Compensation Unit Plan.-In such a plan the company
authorizes the distribution of a certain number of deferred compensation units which are equivalent to the market value of the
company stock on the day on which they are granted. A selection
committee has broad power to determine who shall participate and
the extent to which such participation shall be allowed and awards
are made on the basis of individual performance. Payments are
made upon retirement over a given period of years. This plan requires that reserves be set up. Care must likewise be taken to assure
that such reserves represent general obligations of the company so
that they will not be considered a trust res.
4. Incentive Compensation Plan.-Under this plan, a percentage of
earnings after return on invested capital is set aside. A profit-sharing
committee has wide authority to select personnel from the upper
managerial levels and to determine the award each shall receive.
Compensation is paid out over the succeeding three to five year
period.
The effort here is not so much to create security as to reward
each employee soon after the income is earned. At the same time
payments, which are of course subject to forfeiture, are spread out
over a sufficient period that an employee has a vested interest in
staying with the company.
5. Dividend Unit Profit-SharingPlan.-A variation of the deferred
compensation unit plan is the "dividend unit" plan which has been
used by Du Pont de Nemours and Company. In such a plan each unit
is equivalent to the dividends paid on one share of company common
stock. Dividend units are given to key employees of the company in
accordance with broad powers of the board of directors. Credits are
forfeitable for a period of ten years following the anniversary of the
credit if the employee is dismissed or leaves the company for any
reason other than death or retirement. They then become non-
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forfeitable. Cash benefits are paid annually up to the beneficiary's
eighty-fifth birthday, unless he dies prior to that time, in accordance
with the number of dividend credits built up to his account. The
plan is unfunded.
Certain points should be noted. Dividend unit credits are even
more uncertain than direct profit-sharing. The result is that such a
plan could be undertaken only with a company whose earnings were
stable and which had a consistent dividends policy. Valuable rights
can be wiped out by the unilateral action of the company. It is conceivable that there will be unfavorable tax consequences with respect
to rights which vest in the beneficiary. On the other hand, the plan
does permit deferral of large amounts of income; it does serve as an
incentive to further the best efforts of the executive-beneficiaries and
the length of time before payments become nonforfeitable render an
executive less willing to leave the company.

V.

REQUIREMENTS OF STATE LAW

The important tax questions which surround deferred executive
incentive compensation have tended to obscure many of the legal
problems which have confronted corporate attorneys. In this regard,
it must be remembered that no solution of these tax problems is
worth much if the entire plan can be attacked and destroyed by the
operation of state corporate law.
The management of the day to day affairs of the corporation is a
responsibility which has been conferred by state law upon its board
of directors.80 The determination as to compensation of executives is
considered to be within the category of conduct of ordinary business
and the judgment of the board as to its reasonableness normally may
not be questioned.
There can be no doubt, however, that the board of directors does
not have license to compensate executives in unlimited amounts,
whether the board of directors is itself interested or not. If the board
of directors grants deferred compensation which the court considers
too high, it may well step in to investigate the reasonableness of such
compensation itself. Thus, in Fogelson v. American Woolen Company,81 a pension of $54,000 was voted to the president of the company.
He had earned $100,000 for many years and more than $150,000 in the
year preceding the year in which the pension plan was adopted. The
court of appeals did not determine the validity of the pension on the
merits. It did reverse summary judgment for the defendant and held
that the size of the pension and the great disparity between it and
pensions accorded other employees demanded a trial on the factual
80. E.g., DEL. CODE AxN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (1953).

81. 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948).
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issue of whether or not the board had exercised its honest business
judgment. The court was clearly concerned in that there seemed to
be no reasonable relationship between the size of the pension and the
worth of the services performed by the president, and more precisely
by the value of the pension and its worth as a means of securing a
president of equal ability.
If members of the board of directors are participants in an incentive
compensation plan it is even more likely that the terms of the plan
will be subjected to judicial review. It is essential to the validity of
such a plan that the corporation receive a benefit in return for the
grant of option rights. Such a corporate benefit may be in the form
of a requirement that the optionees remain in the service of the
corporation for a specified period of time as a condition precedent to
the enjoyment of rights under the option.
It is important to recognize that a gift of corporate assets is
generally invalid absent unanimous shareholder ratification, irrespective of whether or not approved by a totally disinterested board of
directors. When this theory was initially employed by minority shareholders to attack stock option plans, the gravamen of the complaint
was that stock option plans accorded the corporation no greater
benefit than it would have received without offering the options and
82
that a gift of corporate assets therefore resulted.
It eventually developed that establishment of the existence of
consideration was relatively uncomplicated. A showing that the
executive was attracted to serve the corporation by the offer of option
rights 83 or that he refrained from resigning because the corporation
offered option rights was held sufficient.8
Complaining shareholders therefore shifted their attack to the
adequacy of the benefit to be received by the enterprise from stock
option plans devised by interested directors for their own compensation. In Kerbs v. CaliforniaEastern Airways the Delaware Supreme
Court indicated that the fairness to the corporation of a plan involving
interested directors was subject to judicial scrutiny. The willingness
of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the board of
directors was a severe blow to the framers of this plan, and others
interested in similar plans. 85 Although the court founded its decision
in that case on the fact that no consideration was forthcoming to the
corporation and invalidated the option plan as tantamount to a gift
of the corporate assets,8 it indicated by way of dictum that even
82. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30
Del. Ch.299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948).
83. Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950).

84.
85.
86.
tive"

Sandler v. Schenley Industries, 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (1951).
33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952).
33 Del. Ch. 69, 74, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (1952). Increased employee "incenwas the stated aim of the plan. The court held that since no guarantee

1959]

EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS

335

where consideration was present it would investigate reasonable
relationship between the value of the option and the value of the
services to be afforded the corporation.8 7 This judgment was surprising to many because the plan had been ratified by a majority of the
shareholders.
In Gottleib v. Heyden Chemical Corporation,decided the same day
as Kerbs, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated even more clearly
a propensity to exercise its business judgment as to the adequacy of
consideration~8 In reversing a summary judgment for the defendants,
the court maintained that interested directors must demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the court that the option was as favorable a bargain
to the corporation as if the interested directors had been dealing with
outsiders. In granting rehearing, however, the court provided interested directors with a vehicle which eases their burden of establishing
the validity of option plans.89 The court contended that the burden
of proving fairness was only incumbent on the directors absent
majority shareholder approval. If shareholder ratification was obtained, the complainant would be obliged to shoulder the burden of
showing that no person of sound business judgment would approve
the plan.90
The importance of placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff cannot be overemphasized. Considerable difficulty is involved in assigning an exact dollar value to the right to purchase stock. Even more
uncertain is the precise value to the corporation of the retained
services of an executive. In view of these factors, it would seem that
Gottleib has established the validity for practical purposes of any
plan which is not actually consummate to a gift of the corporate
assets provided majority shareholder approval has been achieved.
Nevertheless, the Delaware legislature amended the corporation
law in 1953 to render director decisions "as to consideration" received
by the corporation for stock option plans conclusive unless actual
fraud is apparent. 91 This statute at first blush seems to afford little
additional solace to the corporate executive who is concerned with the
of increased incentive existed, there was no consideration to support the
option grant.
87. 33 Del. Ch.69, 75, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (1952).
88. The Gottleib case was before the Delaware Supreme Court on three
occasions. 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (1952), rehearing granted, 33 Del. Ch.
177, 91 A.2d 57 (1952), decision on rehearing, 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594
(1952).

89. 33 Del. Ch.177, 91 A.2d 57 (1952).
90. In Kaufman v. Schoenberg, the court of chancery elaborated on the
Gottleib rule: 'Where there has been independent stockholder ratification

of interested director action, the objecting stockholder has the burden of

showing that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that
the consideration received for the options was a fair exchange for the
options granted." 33 Del. Ch.211 at 221, 91 A.2d 786, at 791 (1952).
91. DEL. CODE ANN.,tit. 8, § 157 (1953).
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validity of stock option plans for interested director beneficiaries. It
is by no means apparent that a "decision of the board" under this
law includes the decision of an interested board. However, since this
enactment followed so closely the Kerbs and Gottleib decisions, it
would appear to be that the determinations of an interested board are
entitled to the same deference as those of directors who do not stand
to benefit from the plan.
It is clear that this statute will not rescue plans under which no
consideration flows to the corporation. In Frankel v. Donovan, decided under the amended law, it was ruled that employee "incentive"
was no consideration since there was no assurance that an ungrateful
employee would not exercise his option and terminate his services
immediately. 92 It seems that the court came precariously near an
investigation of the adequacy of consideration. How closely a search
for the existence of consideration may approach an inquiry into
matters properly relating to the adequacy thereof is obscure, but it
seems certain that so unfavorable an arrangement as to resemble a
gift of the corporate assets will not be tolerated.
Finally, the court in Frankel contended that the amended statute
accorded the same finality to director decisions "as to consideration"
for stock options as had been previously accorded their determinations as to consideration for the issuance of stock.93 In cases involving
interpretations of the statutory conclusivity provisions relating to the
terms of issuance of shares, the courts have indicated a willingness
to investigate the sufficiency of the benefit to the corporation as a
circumstance bearing on possible fraud.9 4
It can be seen that there are a number of aspects of state corporate law which may prove fatal to a deferred incentive compensation scheme. Certainly in Delaware there is a need for a clear
benefit to the corporation in the form of retained services of the
key executives who are given certain forms of deferred compensation. These needs must be measured, however, against the disadvantages such restrictions present. If they are too onerous, an
incentive compensation plan may very well fail to fulfill the need
required of it.
The purpose here has been to present major concepts in the field
of incentive compensation. Certain arrangements effective principally
92. 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1956).
93. 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1956). See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 152 (1953).
Support for this view may be found in the Delaware Supreme Court decision
after rehearing in the Gottleib case. 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594 (1952). The
court found that the conclusivity provision in § 152 of the code relating to
the consideration for the issuance of shares was inapplicable to director
determinations as to the consideration for option rights. The legislature may
have intended to amend the effect of this holding.
94. West v. Sirian Lamp Co., 28 Del. Ch. 398, 44 A.2d 658 (1945); Diamond
State Brewery v. De La Rigaudiere, 25 Del. Ch. 257, 17 A.2d 313 (1941).
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in limited situations have been left to other dissertation. This study
is a recognition of the immense importance of this subject and is an
effort to awaken and sharpen interest in application of these measures
to satisfy the continuing and expanding need for their use. Incentive compensation is not new but the present devices available for
the full realization of its benefits are developments of recent years and
more may be expected. This area has grown and evolved from
necessity and it is not likely that this necessity will be diminished in
the foreseeable term. This realizes an especial emphasis by the
intense international competition into which we have been precipitated, presenting a challenge which we dare not fail but to meet
successfully. Unless we are to ignore the lessons of history and human
behavior we must surely avail ourselves of incentives which will
draw and maintain a constant flow of skilled talent into managerial
roles. In this manner we shall stimulate that talent to that superior
performance and leadership which is vital to the successful direction
of our national enterprise.

